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Chapter I
011 Energy Imports and Preliminary Analysis on Deepwater
Port Alternatives
Introduction
The 18 April 1973 energy message submitted to Congress
by President Nixon underscored the importance of deepwater
port facilities as an important step in the resolution of the
growing energy crisis. The president had this to say concern-
1iog deepwater ports:
It is clear that in the torseeable tuturoe, we will
have to import oil in large quantities. We should do
this as cheaply as we can with minimal damage to
the environment. Unfortunately, our present capa-
bilities are inadequate for these purposes. The
answer to this problem 11es in deepwater ports which
can accommodate those· larger ships, providing important
economic ad.vantages while reducing the risks of col-
lision and grounding. Recent studies by the Council
on Environmental Quality demonstrate that we crill expect
considerably less pollution if we use fewer but larger
tankers and deepwater facilities, as opposed to the many
small tankers and conventional facilities which we
would otherwise need. If we do not enlarge our
deepwater port capacity, it is clear that both American
and foreign companies will expand 011 transshipment
terminals in the Bahamas and the Canadian Maritime
Provinces. From these terminals 011 will be brought
to our conventional ports by growing numbers of small
and medium size transshipment vessels, thereby in-
creasing the risks of pollution from shipping operations
and aecidents. At the same time, the United States will
lo·se the jobs and capital that those foreign facilities
provide. Given these conSiderations, I believe,
we must move forward with an ambitious program to
create new deepwater ports for receiving petroleum
imports. The development of ports has usually been a
2responsibility of State and local governments and the
priv(~te sector. However, States cannot issue licenses
beyond the three-mile limits. I am therefore propos-
ing legislation to permit the Department of the Interior
to issue such licenses. Lioensing would be contingent
upon full and proper evaluation of environmental impact,
and would provide for strict navigation and safety,
as well as proper land use requirements. The proposed
legislation specifically provides for Federal cooper-
ation with State and local authorities.
On 7 November 1973, President Nixon delivered another
energy ~essage in the wake of the October 1973 Yon Kippur
Israeli-Arab War and the subsequent Arab economic retalia-
tion for Israeli support in the form of a complete embargo
of crude 011 to the United States. The President had this
to say about urgent pending Congressional legiSlation; of
which deepwater ports was included: 2
Two years ago, in the first energy message any President
has ever sent to Congress, I called attention to our
urgent energy problem. Last Apr11, this year, I re-
affirmed to the Congress the magnitude of that problem
and I called for action on seven major legislative
initiatives. Again in June, I called for action. I
have done so frequently since then. But thus far, not
one major energy bill that I have asked for has been
enacted •••• This is why it 1s time to act now on vital
energy legislation that will effect our daily lives,
not just this year, but for years to come.
During the same energy message, the President addressed a
new megathought, the challenge of Project Independence:
Finally, I have stressed repeatedly the necessity of
increasing our energy research and development efforts.
Last June, I announced a five year $lO-billion program
to develop better ways of usin~ energy and to explore
and develop new energy sources. Last month, I an-
nounced plans for an immediate acceleration of that
prQgram •••• Today the challenge is to regain the strength
of self-sufficiency ••.•Let uS unite in committing the
resources of this nation to a major new endeavor. An
endeavor that in this bicentennial era we can approp-
riately call Project Independence •••• Let US pledge tbat
by 1980 under Project Independence we Shall be able to
meet .f.unerica's energy needs from America's own energy
resources.
3The President's criticism directed towards Congress
in its failing to act on any of hiS proposals, including
deepwater ports, followed by the challenge of Project
Independence, was met With mixed emotions by energy experts.
Those who are intimately involved with deepwater port
economics contend that if the 1980 goal is feasible, then
the United States does not need a deepwater oil terminal.
From an industry point of view, the likelihood that near
future commitment will be made in deepwater oil terminals
will diminisb until there 1s reasonable certainty that
imports will be a big enough business to support the
investment. Realistically, thiS self-sufficiency state-
ment needs study and clarification. Collectively, many
energy experts throughout the country labeled the plan
unfeasible for 1980 or for many years thereafter. 3 Leaders
on energy matters in Congress con~that year 1980 self-
sufficiency will cost, (if at all possible), $20 billion over
the next 10 years; double the recent com~itment by the
President.~ The Senate, in full confirmation, in a 82 to
o vote, on 7 December 1973, called for thiS broader research
effort, a 10 year program and the spending of $20 billion.'
Due primarily to increased executive pressure and the widen-
ing national energy crisis, the iligh Seas Oil Port Act
(H.B. 5898) was approved by House committee on 5 December
1973 and sent on its way to the house floor. 6 The proposed
legislation appropriately acquired a new name (from offshore
ports and terminal facilities) which appears to be aimed at
assuring single-purpose operations for oil offloading. This
move, seemingly in line with the current energy crisis
confus"ion, appeared to reject tho feelings th"t a single-
purpose offshore oil terminal had lost its economic
justification in favor of a multi-purpose artificial is-
land supe rport •
Project Independence is a demonstration of our efforts
to create a trend towards self-sufficiency but the practice
1s ten to twenty years away. All the efforts cited by the
President; namely the use of coal, exploitation of all shale,
offshore drilling, natural gas, expansion of nuclear power
are transfused with problems both technological and envir-
onmental. Domestic coal reserves are enormous (nearly balf
the world's resources) and capable of providing the United
States with sufficient heat and electricity for centuries,
but the environmental restrictions and tremendous costs
are prohibitive. To put the coal exploitation program on
a crash basis and step up to the Qemand projection of 1.5
billion tons a year by 1985 would present growth costs of
i15 bil~1on or more.7 Shale 011 energy is a decade away
for any sub stant1al contribution to th(:~ energy crisis.
The estimated 600 billion to 3 trillion barrel domestic
shale oil reserves available are expected, even under max-
imum stepped up efforts, to produce only 2,0,000 barrels of
shale oil a day by 1978.8 By 1985, the shale oil industry
could optimistically be expanded to provide 1 million
barrels a day; roughly 6 percent of todays demand for 011
and about 3 percent of the projected 1985 domestic demand
of 30 million barrels.9 Offshore drilling offers the most
5timely contribution but current reserveS are measured
conservatively in decades. The projection problem involves
the quantification of production from offshore fields that
as yet are undiscovered and again, are vastly expensive deep
drilling tasks in deep waters on the continental shelves.
If movement in lifting the current moratorium on drilling
of wells in California offshore waters 1s successful, estim-
ates of 200 to 300 million barrels of oil are forecast. lO
The North Slope oil reserves of Alaska are expected to deliver
2 million barrels by 1977.11 Untapped and hard to recover
resources in the Gulf of Mexico are estimated to hold reserves
of 116 billion barrels.12 Oil prospecting in these areas
as well as off New England and the Middle Atlantic states
has met with bitter resistance from env1ronment~lists and
economists who claim the cost could eventually run into
hundreds of billions of dollars to exploit the undersea
reserves. 13 Natural gas is by far the most desireable energy
source environmentally but heretofore government regulations
have kept the price to low competetively in an effort to
bolster the demand for the cheaper 011. Although estimated
to be sUbstantially more costly than other more readily
usable energy sources, the progress in technology is lacking
for methods of extraction and conservative estimates are
that if it is proved to be economical, the limited domestic
supply is good for only a few decades at best.14 The rapid
increase in nuclear power as an energy source 1s based in the
6short run on the fission process which for various tech-
nological and s&fety standard reaSons has had recent
widespread plant shutdowns. Even with todays energy crisis
dilemma, it 1S unclear when most of the nuclear power plants
will ever become fully operational. Officials in the Atomic
Energy Commission believe that by the 1980's, 150 nuclear
power plants will be delivering 20 to 25 percent of the
domestic electric power.15 In any case, the basic nuclear
fuel in use today, uranium, 1s in short supply and is also
projected to be exhausted in a fev decades. Breeder reactors
are a strong substitute given needed technology break-
throughs. One drawback 1s the fuel, plutonium, considered
as the most poisonous substance known ·to man, 15 an enviro-
mentalist's n1ghtmare. 16 Away in the future, probably
beyond the ye~r 2000, is the projection of fusion nuclear
power with the unlimited availability of the necessary
fuel, deuterium, the ultimate in energy production, is
considered by most the farthest away from development. 17
What do all these projections mean to the current
energy crisis; and speci£ically in the next 10 to 20 years?
The questions of rapid and timely technology breakthroughs
coupled with the staggering costs is definitely something
to consider. The National Petroleum Council estimates
that an adequate ruel resouee program, including outlays
for oil and gas exploration and production, necessary for
self-sufficiency in tbe 1980's means spending upwards of
$500 billion by 198,.18 The reduction in eonsum~tion,
7unless extremely closely regulated 1s likely to be far
from successful. Energy requirements are inevitably going
to grow faster than the alternative domestic sources can
possibley hope to take up the slack. The only answer in
the next two decades, at the least, 1s to import substantial
amounts of crude 011. Self-sufficiency simply cannot
feasibly or rationally be attained by 1980 or most probably
within this century. In contrast ~o this gloomy perspective
the Arabs have recently reported to be willing to boost
oil production more than double their pre-1973 Arab-Israeli
War figure once political problems are solved; conservatively
estimated, an end to the embargo would occur in 1974.19
Self-suffl~iency will be a reality in the twenty-first
century. It is well on its way in theory; but practically
speaking, the importation of foreign oil is essential in
the 1980's as well as the 1990's to keep the pace with a
growing America until the eventual goal of Project Inde-
pendence is attained.
Analysis Overview
In approaching this analysis of foreign oil energy
importation, consideration was taken of many port sites
for United cltates crude 011 delivery with sailings origin-
ating from numerous world points. The altem.at1ves of foreign
transshipment, dredged channels, United States dee~water
transfer terminals and artificial island complexes were
analyzed for transportation savings, costs for tranSfer,
crude oil and product distribution to regional USers within
the South, Midwest and East Coast states. It was determined
that the Gulf Coast was a highly feasible alternative for
:--:--------------
8
importation of foreign crude 011 due to exist1ng refinery
and petrochemical industry, optimistic refinery expansion
projections, the presence of a vast network of pipelines
with expansion forecast and the ex1stanae of liberal envir-
onmental restrictions and land use regulations. In an
effort to place reasonable limitations on the analysis.
the analyst will mGke the following assumptions:
1. All crude oil coming into the Gulf Coast will
originate from the Middle East and Africa (see table 1 and
figures 1 and 2). Because .of lack of sufficient reserves
and internal demands', Western countries will not be sub-
stant1ally supplying the United States with crude 011 ln
the 1980's and thereafter.
2. A fleet mix of tankers between 110,000 and ,00,000
dwt would be used as crude oil delivery vessels. The ex-
pected vessel sizes are to be between 226,000 and 279,000
dwt. Vessels 1n the 6,,000 dwt range would be used in short
delivery runs for crude oil and refined products.
3. The trend in construction of VLCC's will continue.
4. All ports of origin can now handle or will be
able to handle up to 500,000 dwt tankers.
,. For a 2,0,000 dwt tanker, the maximum pumping
rate is approximately 85,000 barrels per hour (unloading
20time about 21 hours at a berth or a buoy).
6. Taking into consideration downtime both due to
weather and maintenance, the deepwater port alternative
deSigns are adequate to handle the required throughput.
9T'able 1
Projected Crude Oil Imports Gulf Coast
~
I
Barrels per I,
Area of Percent of Calendar Day I
Year Origin Total x 1000
1980 Middle East
I
60 2,126
Africa '+0 1,*14-
--
Totals I 100 3,540
'--...-.
I
2000 Middle East 75 ~:§~Africa 25
Totals 100 11,380
I
Source: u.s. Department of the Army, Report of Gulf
Coast Deepwater Port Facilities Texas, Louisiana, Missi-
SSiP~1, Alabama and Florida (Vi~ksburg, MiSSissippi: June
1973 ,p.48. (He~after referred to as Deepwater Port
Facilities). I
Supply and Demand
United States
The growth rate for the demand for petroleum products
in the United States is estimated to be 4.4 percent to date
continuing to year 1980 and 2.2 percent from fear 1980 to
21year 2000. Estimated demand production and import pro-
jections for crude 011 and products 1n the United States
in 1980 and 2000 are shown in table 2.
GuJ.f Coast
The Gulf Coast region refers to the littoral states
from Florida to Texas. The Gulf Coast for some time has
been a surplus producer of domestic crude oil and refined
products. Currently, nearly half of the petroleum products
Figure 1
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Table 2
pnited States Demand/SupplY Projections
Crude Oil and Products
(Barrels per Calendar Day x 1000)
1980 2000
Crude Oil Products Crude Oil Products
Demand 18,700 22,700 32,700 35,000
11,800 18,700 • 32,700Production 13,000
Volume
Imported 6,900 4,000 19,700 2,300
~ource: Deepwater Port Facilities, p.~.
ofIncludes 2 million bed from the North Slope
Alaska.
that are consumed on the East Coast come from Gulf Coast
22
refineries. Projected product shipment from the Gulf
Coast to the East Coast and the Midwest is outlined in
tables 3 and 4. This supply pattern has developed to a
large extent because of the limited refinery construction
along the Atlantic Coas 1; which has been hampered both by
strong enviromental restrictions and non-industrial land
use policies. The Gulf Coast accounts for roughly 42
percent of the total United States refining capacity of
approximately 13,000,000 barrels per caJ.encler daY' (bed). 23
If the Gulf Coast 1s to continue supplying crude oil
and finished products to other regions and meet its own
needs, foreign crude oil imports into the Gulf Coast region
must increase from approximately 3,540,000 barrels per
13
Table 3
Petroleum Demand/SupplY Projections
Gulf Coast
(Barrels per Calendar Day x 1000)
1980 2000
Crude 011 Products Crude Oil Products
Demand 9,5'10 4,680 15,880 6,980
Production 6,800 9,510 5,500 15,880
Surplus or
(2,710) It-,830 (10,380) 8,900(deficit)
Imports (Middle I
East/Africa)
Gulf Coast 2,710 10,380
*Midwest 830 1,000
Total: 3,540 I 11,380
Domestic Shipments
Midwest 3,;30 7,300
East Coast 1,300 1,600
Totall 1+,830 8,900
Source I Deepwater Port Facilities, p. 58.
*Received 1n the Gulf Coast, shipped by pipeline
to the Midwest.
calender day (bed) in year 1980 to 11,380,000 bed in year
2000 (see table 2). Accordingly, to meet the import demands,
total Gulf Coast refining capacity is projected to increase
from the present (1972) ~,818,ooO bed to approximately
9,062,000 bed and 15,175,000 bed in year 1980 and year 2000,
respectively (see table 5' and figure 3).
14-
Table 1+
P1"9 j ected Product Shipment
From TR:e Gulf Coast
(Barrels per Calendar Day x 1000)
1980 2000
Coastal Complex Pipeline Waterborne Pipeline Waterbome
Mobile 0 1 0 2
Baton Rouge ~j[ 128 708 230Pascagoula 36 178 6'j
New OrleanS 364- 105 444 i~Lake Charles 130 82 267
Beaumont-Port
Arthur 571 393 1,125 709
Galveston-
Houston Area 1,570 516 1,806 9d2Corpus Christi 100 155 120 2 1
Subtotal: 3,lt-l1+ 1,416 1+,64-8 2,557
Future East Coast
Product Pipeline 1,695
Totals 4,830 8,900
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities, p.75.
Table 5'
Gulf Coast Refinery Imported AllocatiQn
(Barrels per Calendar Day x 1000)
Coastal Complex Capacity
1972 1980 2000
Mobile 18 19 868
Pascagoula 270 51, 1,~~7Baton Rouge 585 It~3 1, 7New Orleans 548 72 1,270
Lake Charle s 306 438 770Beaumont-Port Arthur 1,291 1,915 a:a~aGalveston-Houston Area 1,460 3,160
Corpus Christi 340 805 1,096
Total 4-,818 9,062 15,175
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities, p. 79.
...
V\
Iii
()
'y
,/
r'll
. -1 )'
3£jo
'?
J
/
(
!::~(;_G~;)
!
/sAx•L.T
~.'-'-~~--_..\~_..~_.. ~I
J
-~,.
\ -"tl "-
't ,-
-N-
/1
;~.
.I~~- --- l--~-~~~~~----.'
g: l ~i
MISSISSIPPI I ALABAMA ( G EO R G I A
: ( i
LOU I s ~A'NA'-} \'!i~0811E{-"--"~-_:- ~
0j::;w'r p~~~p:\~G'~!~P0it'~'~.Pensccc!J , .'-'''-~-_. '--'-
- / I • IV J ~ 1': ~ , . .tv ........~ .Q" "- .~.~~m... I ,/:'~ P3:;CJ'IJIJ!J /-""'_ .. __ . ~~~,;;.:Palla:'na C'l~ (
'/""'. "_.- '" "~"'". \; ,J:\NE'l1 or:ltAt~y/;>,.r~,:; / " :1 :1
H""sO"\! ',~:{/~ ---- ...~ ... . :/'.? 0i' \ 1'--' ~ / \ \ ~/l.\L... h..h'i ;/....:. 1, ------.> ~I! "'-.r· // v ..,- I J'" ,r -'" ~~ ......
";:0..: /. "c,!." ,''' \...... ~,.,..,-,"",~~/ - "
(' • ...-'1,.,J L ( ,/ -..... \.
, " . U,'lv~st('n 60 - - "'-..,- ~ ,-\ :·f ,,'\rr~cDorll~" ~ !:,_r- --........... - __ -. ~ V ,...- .... / ...·./~·I \. \
. "_/~/ t/- -..----_ -,,' / .....-"'\'J;.:..... --.............. "-
• ..,1 } ......... } / ~ ~ \
5:1'"(.,J J' .... I? ....._ ..----. -- ......... ---~/ /' \ \-"" - ..----- ~'" .. -......;" \<'-./_ // _s - '-- l \/~.::-~;l// ,."_-- \J' t.~.......~i"'/ .- \ It;(,~<7:C·'i/ /' \ ~ ~",,:,:. r ....wl\
-1'/) r'r'"" ('h'I'S!1 \ \",r~ v .... ( .. .}u,~, - \
I / ' "" C"(~J: I Figure 3 0 C'
It"! I \ \
,l.1 I . '\
\
' \\ \ Gulf Coast Refinery Complexes \ \ '\
\\ \ \ \ J
\\; II Source: Deepwater Port Fact11ties p 83 I ~~. , .. " ...,
... 4.: 8"".'1"'''' "l~"... \ t
. '. yi';" 'v ....·,
! ,,;' ;'.~ ..... ,1:/
.
b'"f·· ; I{
It I IIil!
I (,oIl
I, f( \, ,
. ifl f
I13°_
J
I
I
'!
~I
~ REFi, ;[RY' COV.PL::X
.-0-c,1
SCALE IN MILES
'00 0 ,oo.! I
----"'-- -~..~:~~I~__----,.-,.-----.'.
16
The growth in refining complexes is correlated to the
projected waterborne small vessel shipments to the North-
east and to eXist~ng and planned growth of pipelines from
the Gulf Coast to the Southeast, Northeast and the Midwest
(see table 4). Withih these Gulf Coast refinery expansion
and import allocation parameters, only minor shift in refinery
location shoUld occur between 1980 and 2000.
Vessel Economies of Size
Supertankers require port and channel depths of 70
to 100 feet. Generally speaking, the United States and
typically the Gulf Coast completely lacks coastal ports of
these depths. The Gulf Coast ports have channels and harbors
averaging 36 to 46 feet in depth which can aceomodate tankers
of approximately 65,000 dwt. The obvious economics of size
in uSing very large crude carriers of 250,000 to 500,000 dwt
(VLCC's) is typified by the following projection. The
United States is today dependent on foreign sources for
approximately 30 percent of its crude oil supply. It is
anticipated that by 1985, the dependence will be nearly 53
percent and the bulk will be originally sailed in VLCC's
from the Mediterranean or the Persian GUlf. 24 When VLCC's
are used, these long haul shipping costs are reduced by
as much as ,0 percent when compared with tankers of 65,000
dwt. 25 In 1971, the average size ship carrying ~mported
crude oil to the United States was 29,000 dwt and accounted
for 4,000 of the 67,770 actual tanker traffic port calls.
17
If no increase in port facilities with respect to accomo-
dating deep draft vessels t&kes place, crude oil imports
would result in about 14,600 arrivals per year by 1980,
26
a 26, perc~nt increase. It is doubtful that enough of
these small tankers would be available, but if they were,
the attendant cost and shipping congestion within the al-
ready crowded harbors and channels of the United States
ports would be staggering.
27Deepwater Port Alternatives
Bahamas Transshipment Terminal
There are two obvious alternatives to the provision
of deepwater terminals in the Gulf of Mexico. Small ves-
sels, in the present 40,000 to 65,000 dwt Size range, may
continue to transport crude oil direct to the Gulf using
existing navigation channels; or ver,y large crude carriers
(VLCC's) may transport the oil to a deepwuter port in the
Bahamas where it would be transferred to smaller vessels
and brought to the Gulf. Preliminary estimates of the total
transportation cost by small vessels direct to the Gulf
indic~ted that this alternative would cost about twice as
much as transport by VLCC's to the Bahamas and then by
smaller vessels to the Gulf. The latter alternative is the
most likely if deepwater facilities 1n the Gulf are not
provided and was used as the base~ for this study. The
equiValent annual cost for the base case was calculated
and used to compute the net transportation savings for the
other alternatives investigated (see table 6).
18
Table 6
Babwoe.s Transsh1Ement Tenninal-Alternat1ve costs
(X i million)
Average annual cost of ocean leg
Throughput: 198o-3,5~tOOO
2000-11,380,000
~
1,913
Average annual cost of transshipment
Facility present worth first costs
Includes: U.S. unloading cost, storage
requirements, crude oil distribution,
pipelines to refineries, product pipelines
to Midwest and East Coast.
Annual Operations and Maintenance Costs
228
1,1"
29
711
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities, p. 110.
Dredged Channels
A system composed of five dredged channels was inves-
tigated tor enlargement to 1,000 feet in width at a depth
of 100 feet. Theses five channels were considered as a
system, and no individual channel optimization ~as considered.
Each of the five channels in the system cons~sts of an
approach channel 1,000 feet wide at the depths stated above,
an inland turning basin with berthing facilities, a tank
farm adjacent to the turning basin for 7-day throughput
storage and pipeline distribution to the respective re-
fining complexes. The channels and projected throughput
( x 1000 bed) for years 1980 and 2000 included in this system
are ~s follows (see figure 4 and table 7):
Mobile Harbor (1980 - 245, 2000 - 2,208)
Mississippi River, Southwest Pass to Baton Rouge
(1980 - 1,538, 2000 - 3,035)
19
Sabine Pass (1980 - ,69, 2000 - 2,566)
Galveston Harbor (1980 - 76" 2000 - 2,773)
Corpus Christi (1980 - 423, 2000 - 798)
Table 7
~!mmarY of Costs For ADO-Foot Deptb
Dredged Chapne. Alternative
1~ob11e Harbor
Mississippi River
Sabine' Pass
Galveston Harbor
Corpus Chri sti
Crude 011 distribution network
Products distribution network
Total:
F1rst Cost ex ilOQQ)
1,049,067
3,lt89,740
1,904,623
1,8,6,5'23
484,462
176,324
646,403
9,607,142
Throughput: 1980 - 3,540,000
2000 -11,380,000
Total Transportation Costs:
(x :i million) ~
615.1
2000
2217·9
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities, Appendix E, p. 16.
Artificial Islands
Three site locations were analyzed, each offshore 1n
approximately 100 feet of water, were considered for the
location of artificial islands to offload and store crude
oil from VLCC's. Each artificial island was sized for 10-
day throughput storage and was protected by a breakwater
which formed the outer wall of the island. An interior
turning basin, exposed only at the entrance, was proVided
'I
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Figure 1+
b Mono.buoy 81te
() Artificial,Island'Site
- CNde Oil - Product Dj,str1but1on
,Pipel.1nes
Site Locations
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities,
pp.89,92,100. SCALE IN MilES
100 0 100
~.-=r.,""", =
"'1 Ot,Te J UN 1973~ ,
,,//
( /
/--:..."W.?(Lde~;I
~!
,++
fjT'·, !--.~ -,--------- --- -
, ~ ./ MIS~'SSIPPI i ALA'8AM~~~~-E '-ol------l
/ . _.-!, __~ "\ e H G I A
. ~~_aS~ e~ .~': L.._" 1 0 "",~ lo",S" CO"S" \?W j // 'I
4l' s / LOU·' S , A.W~ , li.OW' --. --"'- \~ ....,,~ r
o : .."r-"7" - Gul/pol! I "'-::--:---:'---. p.. I 1°'1:: ,..,... ~\ take ChiJ;k's / _ i: 'a ' \ TT. " ~71"', ',~r:s"~~L .- -, ~_. . .._- ". ~ ",
I ,B(':um~Of\\: ;;,~ B~lOi1 P,~~g€ ~P_ ,., .1 ~...J~~~ ] ''- ~ . c p l,)1 __~. .,2/ i'a,,, DJ,3..-/' __ ~,L"r.Jr:JJ It~"~'\U 'O':'l 'I.IS r - ,/ " ~ \' <:1ne......p~ 1' .. I " ;1'." AME~PORT '-. ' , ~ )?O
I ~ v'-~""""~~ \ i , 0l j./.... /\ I
'- (/ ",,.-/ -.. .r I
--\ --- \ /,.'
'\ I:,_~ \ \ () I
" '-~, ..,
, \
l \
'./' \\ )
\ \
\ (
N \
o '", 0
\ "
\ \
I \
\ \
\ 1
. \.
-- ~I ,
f
"I
-N-
I
1 T E X
Jo. II
21
for berth1ng and offloadlng operations. The site locations
considered in this system ~re as follows:
The Mobile - Pascagoul.a site is located southwest of
Mobile approximately 32 miles offshore.
~he Bayou La Fourche site 1s located south of New
Orleans approximately 17 miles offshore.
The Freeport site is located southeast of Freeport
approximately 30 miles offshore.
Monobuoy Systems
Four site locations were analyzed; each offshore in
apprOXimately 100 feet of water were considered for the
location of monobuoys to offload VLCCts. At each of the
monobuoy sites, from one to six monobuoys were clustered
around a central platform; the number being dependent upon
the throughput volume. The monobuoys, anchored to the sea
bed through a pile base, would be approximately 5,000 feet
apart to allow the VLCC's to weathervane about the buoys.
Cargo transfe r take s place from the VLCC to the buoy through
a floating hose connected to the shipts manifold and to a
fluid swivel on the buoy. The buoy, swivel, and hose con-
nection are free to rotate with the ship. Each ~onobuoy
is connected to the central platform by a 48-1nch pipeline.
The central platform contains one pump unit for each line
to onshore plus one spare, a central control room, personnel
quarters, a navigation control system, a beliport, and
emergency and safety equipment. One 48-inch pipeline per
buoy was provided from the central platform to the onshore
22
tank farm. The site locations considered in thiS system
are as follows:
The Mobile - Pascagoula site 1s located southwest of
Mobile approximately 32 miles offshore.
The Bayou La Fourche site 1s located Southof New
Orleans approximately 17 miles offshore.
The Sab~ne Pass site is located south ot the Lou-
iSiana, Texas border approximately 80 miles offshore.
The Freeport site 1s located southeast of Freeport
approximately 30 miles offshore.
Optimum Alternatives
Both the monobuoy and the artificial island alterna-
tive have numerous variations in s1tings, grouped complexes,
distance from shore to the 100 foot depth contour, refinery
location, and crude oil and product distribution networks.
Of the 20 alternatives, one monobuoy alternative of three
separate ports (see table 8) and one artificial island
alternative of two separate islands (see table 9) are
singled out as the most economically and enVironmentally
feasible (see figure ~).
Financial Analysis
Costs for the variOlJB alternatives are e~ressed as
the present worth of all first costs, the equivalent annual
first cost and the equivalent annual maintenance and oper-
ations cost. All disbursements are assumed to be discounted
from the base date of 1979; using 1973 capital costs. The
alternatives were all Sized for the ultimate, or year 2000
23
Table 8
Summary of Costs For Optimum Monobuoy AJ.!iernat~ve
(X $ million)
Item
Mobile-Pascagoula (3 buoy)
Monobuoy canst~ct1on
Throughput: 1980-2~5,OOO
2000-2,208,000
Crude oil inland
distribution
Bayou La Fourche (4 buoy)
Construction
Throughput: 1980-1,538,000
2000-3,035',000
Crude 011 inland
distribution
Freeport construction(5 buoy)
Throughput: 1980~1,757,000
2000-6 13?,000
Crude 011 distribution
(inland)
Product distribution
(cross country)
Total Transportation Costs:
(X $ million)
First Cost
213.4
12.3
249.7
512.4
282.9
647.7
12.a.Q
671.4
Annual
o & M Cost
0.3
11+.8
7.9
23.6
~
2272.8
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities, Appendix E,
Attachment E-l, pp. 1-26.
throughput; although, berths, buoys and storage facilities
were added as the demand required. Because of the compli-
cation of varying economic lifetimes of the major system
components and the incremental additions of buoys and
marginal berths to the terminal alternatives, all costs
were converted to a present worth first cast and then dis-
counted to equivalent annual first costs at 8 percent over
Table 9
SummarY of Costs For Artificial Island Alte~ativ~
(X $ million)
Item
Mobile-Pascagoula Island
construction (5 berths)
Throughput (x .million bed):
1980-1783
2000-5243
Freeport Island
construction (5 berths)
Throughput (x million bed):
1980-1757
2000-6137
Crude oil inland
distribution
Product cross country
di s tributioD
Total Transportation costs:
( X :j million)
First Cost
789.0
646.4
~
669.4
Annual
o & M Cost
30.6
23.3
~
2268
Source: Deepwater Port Facilities, p. 18.
an average economic life of 25 years. This method auto-
matically accounted for replacement costs of more perishable
components • Equivalent annual maintenance and operations
costs were derived from present worth costs and expressed
as equivalent annual costs over tbe economic lifetime of the
alternatives. (The capital recovery factor for 8 percent
over 25 years is .09368.)
Weather Mainten~nce and Holiday Downtime
Single-point mooring (SPM) buoys are unprotected by
barriers but are considered highly suited for operations at
offshore locations where sea and weather conditions may be
25
severe. A VLCC can remain moored at a monobuoy in over
l,-foot significant seas in combination with 60 knot winds
and strong currents. Berthing operations would he precluded
in 6 - 8 foot seas with 25 knots of wind, and crude oil
transferring in 10 - 12 foot seas with 40 knots of wind. 28
On an annual basis, in the GUlf, waves up to 8 feet
can be expected for a total of 20 days per year, up to 12
feet for about 4i days per year and up to 20 feet for about
one-half day per year. 29 An artificial island sheltered
harb~r would have lower berth high seas downtime with the
same weather conditiona (estimated to be in the area o,f
about 50 percent less), but would not reduce downtime due
30to wind or fog.
For the purposes of this study, downtime to weather
will not appreciably prevent the demand throughput require-
ments. Carrier waiting time during periods of high seas
1s unavoidable.
The available working days for a monobuoy (one buoy)
would be 334 taking into consideration maintenance and local
and federal holidays; for the artificial island berth,
31350 days.
Inland and Deepwater
Port Dlst~ibution Systems
The secondary distribution tug/barge was costed with
each offshore alternative and was found to be significantly
more expensive than underwater pipeline distribution and
- 32
,..-il1 not be considered further. Three product pipelines,
Colonial, Plantation and Dixie, move petroleum product ship-
ments to the Atlantic Coast area. The pipelines will be
26
expanded to provide for projected increased product ship-
ments to include a major new East Coast product pipeline.
Shipment of both crude and petroleum products to the Mid-
west region will be moved through the exp.anded Capline
system. In addition, waterborne shipment of products by
shallow draft tankers will supplement the product pipelines
to the Atlantic Co.ast. Crude oil distribution networks
between the deepwater port complexes and regional refinery
complexes by pipeline were considered in the costing of the
various deepwater alternatives.
Gulf C9ast Deepwater Port Development33
Most of the actiVity along the Gulf Coast 1s being
accomplished 1n Louisiana, Texas, Alabama and Mississippi.
In Louisiana, 13 oil companies have formed a consortium
known as LOOP (LouiSiana Offshore Oil Port, Inc.). They
have planned a facility to tie into the Capline pipeline.
LOOP would like to start construction in 197~ and have the
facilities in operation by late 1976. In Texas, 12 011
companies have formed a similar consortium called SEADOCK.
ThiS group also plans on a construction start in 1974 with
completion in 1976. Alabama and Mississippi have also formed
a Joint Quperport Task Force called the Ameraport Council,
and are proceeding with the studies aimed at justifying a
deepwater port facility off the Alabama/Mississippi Coast.
Environmental/Ecological AnalYSiS or Alternat1¥es
The public's view seems to be concentrated on the poten-
tial environmental and ecological damage that might result
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from petroleum spills. The danger of uncontrolled release
of petroleum into the environment arises primarily from
the possibility of accidental collisions and groundings of
vessels, from spills during transfer of petroleum from
ocean going vessels to either other tank vessels, or into
pipelines and storage tanks, and from the poSSibility of
leakage of the tanks themselves. The degree of hazard is
partly a function of the delivery system employed, in-
cluding the size, design, and operation relating to the transfer
and storage of petroleum. The probability of spills tends to
increase with the greater congestion of waterways associated
with the use of smaller vessels. In general, primary
ecological and environmental problems associated with the
various deepwater ports are as follows:
Bahama Transshipment Terminal. If deepwater terminals
in the Gulf of Mexico are not developed, either a larger
number of small vessels will continue to transport crude 011
using existing navigation channels, or VLCC's will transport
crude oil to a deepwater port in the Bahamas where it ~ould
be transferred to sm.aller vessels for shipment to the Gulf.
Under either of these conditions, the probability of an oil
spill occurring at existing ports is greater than with off-
shore facilities; due primarily to increased vessel traffic
1n channels and harbors. In addition, crude oil is more
likely to be introduced dire'ctly into the estuarine and
marsh environment with the transshipment alternative than
with offshore facilities.
28
Dredged Channels. The system of five dredged channels
considered in thiS study would have the greatest environ-
mental impact of facility alternatives considered. Construc-
tion and maintenance of these channels would require
considerable disruption of aquatic and terrestrial habitats
due to dredging activities and disposal of dredged material.
Associated areas of environmental disruption include inter-
ference ~ith ground-water quantity and quality, salt-water
intrusion, and turbidity. Also, probabilities that crude
oil could be spilled directly iB estuaries and marshes
would be greater with this alternative than with offshore
facilities.
Artificial Islands. The primary impacts of artificial
islands would be related to possible alteration of existing
current patterns and loss of bottom habitat at the site.and
at the piping area. The effects of these islands on currents
and water circulation are not known, and would vary from site
to site. The structures themselves would create some
additional habitat for marine organisms. This alternative
provides the greatest opportunity to provide for the con-
tainment of oil spillS occurring during offload1ng. Impacts
of a more temporary nature include increased turbidity
during construction and disruption of bottom and marsh
habitat for pipeline installation.
Monobuoy Systems. Monobuoys themselves would have
little impact on the enVironment. Primary impacts would
result from casualty 011 spills, spills during offloading
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and pipeline operation. Dredging requirements to construct
the monobuoy would be minimal e~cept for dredging necessary
to construct a pipeline for transporting 011 to shore.
Therefore, dredging impacts will be short-term and transitory.
National Overview
The deepwater port problem impacts on broader, higher-
level objectives of the national security and the national
ecomomy. An industrial nation like the United States is
depe~dent upon continued growth, both internal and external.
ThiS gro~th has placed the United States in a position of
world industrial, economic and political power. Trans-
portation restriction specifically in the area of the
deprivation of a competitively priced crude 011 energy
source will have widespread ramifications. In the area of
national security, domestic oil reserves must be protected
for possible use 1n the event of war or economic blackmail
from the 011 producing nations. To preserve the domestic
reserve~ the importation of oil, until the United States
achieves substantial domestic self-sufficiency, is mandatory.
Another form of self-sufficiency involves the refining
industry. In this regard, without a superport. the refin-
ing industry would relocate' to foreign shores (transshipment
terminals), and their products would be imported with the
attend'ani loss of American jobs and an overall degredation
of our regional and national economy_ Such capital move-
ments would also be reflected in an added unfavorable balance
of payments with resulting damage to the value of the dollar.
r •
30
The United States industrial base is dependent upon
a low cost sea transport of liquid and bulk raw materials.
The development of superports is mandatory to keep abreast
of world shipping and the economies of scale for aBa (011-
bUlk-ore) super carriers. Large industrial complexes will
lose their cost.effectiveness 1f low cost waterborne trans-
portation to both recieve and ship vital raw materials is
not achieved. Coupled With environmental concern. absense
of inexpensive water transportation could well desolate
large areas of industrial concentration.
Other consequences of the lack of deepwater port
development include the folloWing:
1. Failure to maximize the benefits of constructing
large U.S. flag vessels.
2. Promotion of industrial isolationism in that many
foreign markets would simply be unattractive to the U.S.
businessman.
3. Reduction in the U.S. prestige and tlpresence"
abroad.
International Jurisdictional Problems 34
A questionable area 1s our right to the use of the
seabed along the continental shelf outside our terxitor1al
zone (3 miles!, when the recovery of natural resources is
not the purpose (ie., as opposed to offshore drilling
operations). The President has recently propo~ed legisla-
tion amending the Outer Continent~ Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
to provide for a so called "r 1ght-of-way ll for pipelines
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and the establishment of a "navigation II hazard in the form
of a bUoy terminal complex or an artificial island. The
legislation is intended to provide ~ complete legal regime
for liscensing of the waters and the se.abed beyond the 3 mile
limit. According to the Geneva Conventions of 1958, within
the limit of the territorial sea tbe jurisdiction of the
coa5t~ state is virtually absolute; subject only to
allowing rights to foreign vessels of innocent passage
and entry in distress. If the deep draft port facility
must utilize the high seas or the seabed beyond the seaward
limit of the territorial sea, the legal regime 1s vague
and without precedent. An equally weak justification con-
sidered sufficient by many law makers is the other uses
criteria "recognized by the general principles of inter-
national law. II All the open sea deepwater ports considered
in this study are on the high seas. A deepwater port mayor
may not be internationally pen~itted use of the high seas
as prescribed by the Law of the Sea. This being the case,
the process of emerging norms of customary international
law provides at least a mechaniSm for undertaking the con-
struction of such facilities pending agreement on the subject.
Summary
The President strongly emphasized deepwater port
development in his mid-April energy message prior to pro-
claiming a national goal siX months later of self-sufficiency
by 1980 through the challenge of Project Independence. One
of the major legislative proposals still outstanding yet
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continuing to be emphasized by the President and Congress
1s deepwater ports development. The sudden emergence of
Project Independence subsequent to the Arab 011 embargo
has increased the risk of capital investment but realis-
tically the national need of deepwater ports still remains.
The question 1s the assumed avai1ab111,ty of large amounts of
imported 011. Project Independence is seen by many energy
experts as unfeasible in the 1980 1 8 and possible the 1990's
due to gaps in technology and spiraling prohibitive costs.
The analysis of the alternatives, for deepwater devel-
opment include foreign terminal transshipment, the use of
Gulr Coast dredged channels, offshore monobuoy and artificial
island complexes. The economic analysis considers crude
011 originating in the Persian Gulf and Africa with super-
tankers carr1ers as the driving force toward beneficial
savings in transportation cost. Advocate views self-
sufficiency and ecology are briefly addressed although not
in discrete quantitative terms. The necessary facility
costs are available to base a cost-effectiveness comparison
on year 1980 and 2000 data. Capital investment is dis-
counted at 8 percent over an economic lifetime of 25 years
with alternatives sized for an ultimate year 2000 throughput.
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Chapter II
Case StudY Analvsis for Gu*f Coast Deepwater Port!
Goal and Objective
1. This study 1s a regional investigation of the
deepwater port potential of the United States littoral to
the Gulf of Mexico. The~ is to provide adequate crude
oil throughput to the Gulf Coast refineries for regional
domestic requirements and external demands of petroleum.
products to the Atlantic states and both crude oil and
petroleum- products to the Midwestern states. Historically,
the Gulf Coast has been a surplus producer of both crude
011 and product~ receiving almost all its crude all from
local fields both on the mainland and the continental shelf.
Current projections indicate that the prod.uction of crude
oil along the Gulf Coast will peak and decline in the near
future. By year 1980, ~rojected demands placed on Gulf
Coast refineries and crude oil shipment will create a
deficit of 3,540,000 bed; growing to 11,380,000 bed 10
year 2000. Therefore, the importation of cruQe oil wi~l
be necessary to both supplement regional needs and external
demands. The coastal refinery capacity is projected to
increase linearily from the present 4,818,000 bed to approx-
ima~ely 9,062,000 bed and 1;,175,000 bed in years 1980
and 2000, respectively.
2. The 2£Jective 1s to identify the advantages
(benefits) and disadvantages (costs) of using supertankers
from the Niddle East and Africa to deter::line the most
economically and environmenta11y feasible deepwater port
system for future development.
Measures of Effectiveness and Cost
1. A measure Qf e~fectivenesA is the throughput of
foreign crude oil for a giv~n refinery complex demands.
For this study, this evaluation of effectiveness for the
various deepwater alternatives is fixed. Irhe projected
expanded refinery capacities and subsequent imported 011
allocations drive the effectiveness to assume inflexible
fixed demands. A more formidable measurement ~ e{fectiye-
ness (MOl!:) is the net annual transportCition savings. The
-
net annual transportation savings is the difference between
the total annual costs of the Baham~s transshipment (base
case) alternative and the other individually considered
alternatives.
The measurement of cost (MOC) is the total annual
.........~~.....-~----
costs of the alternative including all transportation,
facility, and crude oil and product distribution networks.
The end point for this analySiS is considered to be at the
product distribution points of the Midwest, East Coast and
the Gulf Coast regions.
CriteriQll
1. The test of preferredness to be used in evalu-
ating the alternatives will be based on maximi2ing annual
net tr5.n.'portation savings (MOE) at fixed crude 011 import
demands. Due to the spread of refinery complexe~ on the
Gulf Coast, a mix of deepwater ports was included within
both the island and monobuoy alternatives. Each component
of the preferred alternative will be separately analyzed
by a marginal cost-margirwl effectiv,:]ness criteria. While
one alternative may best m.eet the initiul criterion, a
component port within the alternative will be analyzed,
according to its individual cost-effectiveness. Addition-
ally, indirect effects of the environment will be considered.
Assumptions-Constraints
1. The financial data provided in each case consists
of the total present worth of all first costs, the equiv-
alent annuhl facility first cost (including replocements),
the equivalent annual maintenance and operations costs,
the annual net transportation savings and the net savings
per unit of throughput expreased per barrel. All dis-
bursements are discounted from the base date 1979. The
present worth costing provide s for incrementally imple-
menting component stages as demanded by increasi~g
throughput requirementsw Throughput growth and refinery'
expansion is assumed to increase line~rly from year 1980
to year 2000.
2. Maximum throughput volume according to refinery
allocation demands was assUmed throughout the analysis.
3. Because of expected internal demands, super-
tanker economies ot scale, and limited reserves of Western
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oil producing countries, the Middle East and Africa will
be the only countries importing crude oil to the Gulf
Coast deepwater ports.
4. The upward trend in construction of very large
crude carriers (VLCC's) will continue. The largest tanker
in service today is the Globtik Tokyo, 475,000 dwt, with a
draft of 92 feet fully loadect. 35 No tankers less than
110,000 dwt would de,liver crude oil to a Gulf Coast deep-
water port. Tankers 1n the ranges of 65,000 dwt would be
utilized in short leg delivery rwlS for crude oil and re-
fined products. The service of tankers ranging in size
between 110,000 and 500,000 dwt; with the me~n vessel
sizes (the "most probable Ship") between 226,000 and 279,000
dwt will be assumed.
5. The demand for petroleum products in the United
States will increase rapidly in the near future at a growth
rate of approximately 4.4 percent annually from 1973 to
1980 and 2.2 percent annually from 1980 to 2000. It is
likewise assumed that domestic crude oil production is
expected to increase only slightly (decrease slightly for
Gulf Coast production); therefore, necessitating crude
oil importation. Accordingly, refinery capacity on the
Gulf Coast is expected to meet projected external as well
as internal demands (see table 3 ) •
6. Each alternative was analyzed with secondary
modes of transportation (offshore terminal to intermediate
storage) of tug/barge and pipeline. The tugjbarge distr1-
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bution was not considered competitive and will not be
considered in the analysis.
7. An ove~all economic life time of 25 years was
used with present value fixed cost~ discounted at 8 percent.
8. If deepwater facilities are not provided in the
Gulf, the possible alternative of transporting crude 0'11
to Gulf Coast terminals directly from the Middle East and
Africa in small tankers was assumed highly uneconomical.
It is estimated that it would cost approximately twice as
much as transshipping oil in VLCC's from the Bahamas base
case; therefore, it will not be considered in the analysis.
Alte rnatives
(see tables 10, 11 and 12)
Alternative A - Bahamas Transshipment (base case)
1. Ostensibly a no action alternative in which VLCC's
would transport crude oil to a deepwat~r port in the Bahamas
and transfer the crude oil to smaller vessels for trans-
shipment to the Gulf Coast.
alt~rnative B - Dredged Channels
1. A system of five dredged channels that would supply
the crude oil directly to the major refinery complexes;
thus, not necessitating an offshore deepwater port facility.
Alternative C - Artificial Islands
1. A two site alternative, both islands offshore in
approximately 100 feet of water, was considered optimum
from an array of proposed sites.
Alternative D - Monobuoy Systems
1. A three site alternative, each site offshore in
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approXimately 100 feet of water, was considered optimum
from' an array of proposed s1tes.
Co~par1son of Alternatives
As shown in table la, alternative B, the dredged
channel system, was not economically feasible in any respects
when compared to alternative A, th(: base case. Alternative
C, the artificial iSland, was not economically feasible;
although marginally when projected to year 2000 throughput
(estimated to be a deficit savings of l¢ per barrel). The
monobuoy alternative was economically feasible for all
practical purposes throughout the test period. A deficit
annual transportation savings of $2.9 million annually was
realized at the outset during year 1980, but it is not a
realistic meaSure of effectiveness. The present worth
first cost concept of annually costing the alternatives
with an equivalent cost is biased in that the initial cash
outlays are greater than they would otherwise be. The
deficit is substantially small when compared to the next
best alternative (the monobuoy annual savings deficit is
apprOXimately 1 percent of the island deficit).
Further quantitative analysis for the preferred
monobuoy alternative can be illustrated with the selection
criterion of marginal cost-marginal effectiveness. This
method of analysis is particularly meaningful in that it
allows a cost-effective measure of each port complex within
the given alternative. In figure 5, a smooth curve is
drawn through the three plotted sub-systems; each normalized
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Table 10
Su."!lmary of Alternatives
(X ~ million)
-
Annual Annual Facility Annual
Alte rnative s Throughput Transportation First o & M(Location) (xlOOO bed) Cost Cost Costs
1980 2000 1980 2000
A
Ba.hamas Trans-
Shipment To: 789.4 2624.4 1155'.0 29.0
P81lama Ci ty 424 I0
Pensacola 0 424
Mobile Harbor 5 440
Pascagoula 240 920
Mississippi River 15'38 3035
Sabine Pass 569 2566
Galveston Harbor 765 277SCorpus Christi 423 79
Total: 3,540 11,380 I
B
Dredged Channel 615.1 2217.9 9607.1 666.1 I
Mobile Harbor 245 2208
Mississippi River 1538 3035
Sabine Pass 569 2566 II
Galve.ston Harbor 765 2773
Corpus Christi 423 798
Total: 3,540 11,380
C
Artificial Island 669.4 2226.8 4359.5 125.6
Mobile-Pascagoula 1783 5243
Freeport 1757 6137
Total: 3,540 11,380
D
l~onobuoy 671.4 2272.8 2061,1 65.0
Mobi1e-F ascagoula 245 2208 IIBayou La Fourche 1538 3035
Freeport 1757 6137
I
Total: 3,540 11,380
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Table 11
Summary Qf Alternatives
(x $ million)
Annual Annual Net Transportation
Alternatives Facility Total Cost Sav1nls
First Cost (MOC) MOE I • Per Barrel
1980 I 2000 1980 2000 I *1980 ··2000
I
A 108.2 926.6 2761.6 --_ .. - ---- ---~ ----
B 900.0 2181.2 3184.0 -125'4.6 -1022.4
-.97 -.246
408.4 1203.4 2802.8 I 41.2 -.214 IC - 276.8 1- -.01
D II 193.1 929.; 2530.9 - 2.9 + 230.71-.00221 +.056
*Based on 1.2921 x 1°99 barrels per year throughput.
**Based on 4.1537 x 10 barrels per year throughput.
Table 12
.Ranking By Transportation Savings
Rank Alternative **Net Savings(x ~ million)
1980 2000
I 1 Monobuoy - 2.9 + 230.7
2 Artificial Island - 276.8
-
41.2
3 Dredged Channel -1254.6 -1022.4
*Discounted at 8 percent over 25 years economic life.
**Bahamas transshipment alternative was used as the base case.
1+1
to the most costly and the most effective (greatest
throughput) port component. These normalized cost and
ef~ective comparators are illustrated in table 13. The
tangent line having a slope of 45 degrees (llisomargina1 cost-ef
fectiveness tt line) 1s tangent and closest to the curve
at the La Fourche site for both the 1980 and 2000 through-
put projections.
Table 13
Marginal Cost-Marginal Effectiveness Criterion
Monobuoy Alternative
**Relative
*Fac1lity Facility Annual Annual
Port Annual Cost Annual Throughput Cost Throughput
1980 2000 1980 2000
Freeport 97.20 1757 6137 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bayou La
It8 .1+6 1538Fourche 3035 .,0 .88 I .,0
Mobile-
Pascagoula 28.11+ 21+-5 2208 .29 .14 .36
*Facility annual cost included the construction cost, 0 & M
and the crude oil network distribution costs. The product dis-
tribution network was not included.
**The costs and throughputs are normalized 1n the mathema-
tical sense and thus expressed as the relative cost and throughput
as a percentage of unity. The comparator for both cost and effect-
iveness is the Freeport monobuoy complex.
SensitiVity
Discount Rate
1. The initial discount rate used to determine the
preferred alternative waS 8 percent; a rate too low and
Figure 5a
Marginal Cost-Marginal Effectiveness·
• SEADOCK (Freeport)
LOOP (Bayou LaFourche)
(Mobile/Pascagoula)
I ...
Year 1980
1.0
•5 1.0
Relative Effectiveness
Figure ;b
Marg1p!l CQst-Marg~nal Effectiveness·
SEADOCK (Freeport)
4&"1
LOOP (Bayou LaFourche)
Year
~~~ORT (Mobile/pascagoula)
\,0
·5 \.~
Relative Effectiveness
*Compar1son of cost (C) and effectiveness (E) where the
~i:~~~r~;pclg~~~~)tgX!g~Stani~~c~~ge{h:el:g~}~~c~Iv;~:ss
curve illustrates the principal of marginal cost-marginal
effectiveness (utility). The critical point (of the selection
criterian) is that point at which an increment of cost is
matched by an equal increment of effectiveness; mathematically
where dC/dE = 1 (an angle of 16 degrees with each axis).
generally unacceptable to industry given the substantial
risks involved 1n constructing a deepwater port. One of the
obvious risk~ 1s the possibility of a major forced change
in United States oil import policies created by extenlal
diplomatic confrontations with the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). This would dras-
tically reduce the necessity of a deepwater port for large
scale VLCC transfer with the attendant economics of scale
as projected in this study. There may be changes 1n poli,c1es
affecting other energy sources; such as nuclear power,
through breakthroughs in technology, which will greatly
decrease demand for crude oil. In each case the risks are
also accounted for through the useful or economic lifetime
concept vice the physical lifetime of a deepwater port
facility. The economic lifetime of 25 years assumed in
this study is approximately one-half of the proposed physical
lifetimes of the major components of the port, the buoys and
platforms,.36 Nevertheless, the discount rate of 8 percent
is considered too low. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has set a 10 percent standard discount rate for com-
parable government investments with similarly unpredictable
varying discount rates. High risk investments are generally
in the 10 to 15 percent range. For this study, the preferred
alternative was analyzed for discount rates of 10, 15 and
20 percent (see table 14 and figures 6 and 7). As each
total capital investment 1s discounted, the meaSure of effectiveness
remains the annual net transportation savings as compared
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Table 14
DiscquQt Rate Sensitivity MonQbUQY Alternative
(x $ million)
%Change "''''Net
Discount In Discount Net Total Transportation %Ohange
Hate Rate
I
Cost (MOC) Savings (MOE) MOE
II I 1980 2000 1980 I 2000 1980 2000
I 8% ------- I 929.5 2530.9
-
2.9 230.7 ---- -~ ..-
I
I 2564.910% +25% I 963.5 - 17.9 215.7 - 71.7% - 6.5%
15% +87.5% 11055.3 II 2655.9 - 58.4 176.2 ..211.0% -23.6~
20% +150% 1153.0 2754.4 -101.2 132.4 -358.0% ..42.6%
·Capita1 recovery factor (eRF) =-t !l+ft)n where, 1 = interest
l+i) -1 I
rate (discount rate) and n =years to recover investment. Data:
n = 25 years; ORF = .09368 for 8%, .ll01? for 10%, .15~70 for 15%
and .20212 for 20%.
"'*For 8, lOt 15 and 20 percent discount rates, the ,~verage
net annual transportation savings based on 7,460,000 bed throughput
(durlnf year 1990) 1s $113.9 (4.2¢/barre1), ~98.9 (3.6¢!barrel),
~58.9 2.2¢/barrel) and $15.6 million (0.6¢!barrel), respectively.
with the base case Bahamas transshipment terminal. Although
lmplic1t~y, a profit motive is always apparent, the objective
of thiS study is to meet demand throughput at minimum trans-
portation cost (or, in the same sense, at maximum net
transportation savings). All the alternatives, With the
exception of the monobuoy system, are not economically feaSible
at the 8 percent discount rate.
The preferred alternative, the monobuoy system exper-
ienced a net transportation savings deficit during the
outset of the te&t period years 1980 to 2000. Marginally
uneconomical as compared to the base case, the net loss 1s
Year 2000
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reduced to zero at about 7t percent discount rate; approach-
ing a net gain in transportation savings of ~ll.l million
at a discount rate of 6 percent. For a 25 percent increase
in discount rate (8 to 10 percent), the net transportation
savings decreased 71.7 percent and 6.5 percent for years
1980 and 2000, respectively. For year 2000, the change in
discount rate was moderately sensitive. At the outset
(year 1980) the discount rate 1s highly sensitive; decreasing
1n sensitivity as the throughput increases.
Volume
1. A volume analysis was made representing throughput
volumes of 70,80 and 90 percent (see table 15 and figure 8).
Table 15
Volume Sensitivity
Monobuoy Alternative
(x $ million)
I I I *Net%Volume Base Case Monobuoy Transportation %Change
I Throughput MOe Moe Savings (MOE) MOE
I 1980 I 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
,
100>~ I 2761.6 929.5 2530.9 I 230.7926.6 - 2.9
--- ---
90% 847.7 2499.2 862.1 2303.6 -14.4 195.6 596% 15.2%
I
I
80% 768.7 2236.7 795.2 2076.3 -26., 16Q.4 1014% 30.5% I
70% 1689.8 11974.3 728.1 1849.1 -38.3
I 125.2 1420% 45.7%
I'
I 60% 610.8 11711.8 661.0 1621.8 -50.2 90.0 1831% 60.9%
*The breakeven point for projected volume (zero net trans- Iportation savings (MOE» occurs at 102% for year 1980 and 34%
for year 2000 (see figure 8). By setting the MOets to equal each
other and solving for the percentage (789.4 x + 29 + 108.2 =
671.4 x + 65 + 193.1); x =1.02 or lO~.
110
102 %J
-100
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The preferred monobuoy system alternative was tested. Oper-
ations and maintenance costs were held constant while annual
first costs, discounted at 8 percent, were lowered according
to volillne of throughput reductions. As was expected, the
significantly small net savings at the projected 1980 through-
put was extremely sensitive with a volume reduction. A
ninety percent reduction in throughput resulted in a. 596
percent reduction 1n net transportation costs (2.9 million
to a 14.~ million dollars net savings deficit). The year 2000
throughput experienced a manageable decrease in net trans-
portation savings of 15.2 percent for a volume reduction of
90 percent. The net decreases in transportation savings
are highly elastic to shortages of supply and are increasingly
sensitive at low initial savings as the volume reduction is
increased. The reduction in volume throughput drives the net
savings to zero at apprOXimately 34 peroent of volume for
year 2000. In year 1980, net transportation saVings 1s zero
at approximately 102 percent of volume throughput.
Economic Lifetime and Fleet Mix
1. The study was from the outset deSigned for a year
2000 projected throughput. With this in mind, varying the
economic lifetime as a test for senSitivity would have been
counter-productive. Similarly, with fleet mix of super-
tanker sizes t it was assumed that a specified range of vessel
sizes would be used. The conclusions of this study would
not be sensitive to the assumed fleet mix as long as the
reSUlting expected vessel size falls within the range tested
(226,000 to 279,000 dwt). What is signif~cant is that the
cost of a deepwater monobuoy port to accomodate a 250,000
dwt tanker is no,t significantly less than the cost of
facilities to accommodate ,00,000 dwt tankers while the dif-
ference in transportation savings is significantly in favor of
the larger vessel.
Environmental Effects
The Bahamas transshipment alternative would pose a
more direct threat to the wetlands environment with the
large number of small vessels frequenting port facilities.
The probability of an oil spill is much greater than all
the other alternatives considered. The dredged channel
alternative would have the greatest environmental impact
of facilities tested due to considerable aquatic and ter-
restrial habitat disruption. Additionally, the probability
of oil spills directly into estuaries and marshes would be
far more damaging than for offShore a1ternatives. The offshore
alternatives would reduce the poSSibility of oil spills to
the less probable casualty spills and malfunctioning of
offloading hardware and pipeline operations. The artificial
island alternative would have an i~pact on bottom habitats
which would be Somewhat small in scale. Containment of
oil spills would be far more easier. The monobuoy alterna-
tives would have little permanent impact on the environment.
Primary impacts would be with casualty oil spills. Dredging
operations would be tranSitory and short term. Overall,
monobuoys appear to be the most environmentallY acceptable
deepwater port facility alternative.
...-::------------------------------ --
Conclusions
This study analyzes four delivery alternatives for
import of foreign crude 011 1n the Gulf Coast tegion from
po·int of origin in the Middle East and Africa entirely in
supertankers. Study conclusions are as folloYs:
1. Development of deepwater ports along the Gulf
Coast to import foreign crude oil 1n large quantities is
economically feasible.
2. At discount rates of 8 percent or greater, the
Bahamas transshipment, artificial island and dredged channel
alternatives are not economically feasible.
3. The monobuoy system'is the most economically
feasible deepwater port investigated. At 10 percent discount
rate the average transportation savings is 3.6¢ per barrel
($98.9 million a year).
4. The three-port alternative, the Mobile-Pascagoula
(Ameraport project), La Fourche (LOOP project) and Freeport
(SEADOCK project) complex, is the most preferred alternative.
5. The La Fourche monobuoy complex is singularly the
most cost-effective of the three-port monobuoy alternative.
6. Dispersion of import facilities would tend to
maximize social and economic im~orts.
7. The artificial island complex should be considered
further with respect to multiple uses (ie., iron ore and
coal, etc.). As a single crude 011 transfer terminal, it is
not economically feasible; otherwise it might be.
8. In the short run (year 1980), the foreign trans-
shipment terminal (base case) is equally cost-effective
for all practical purposes when compared with the monobuoy
com~lex, but its cost-effectiveness d1min~shes as the through-
put increases. Additionally, the attendant projected balance
of payments deficit and relocation in refinery industry
negate any visible positive considerations.
9. The environmental advantage of deepwater ports
is that they not only lessen the risk of oil spills resulting
from collisions and groundings, but they minimize the prob-
ability that oil spilled will reach beaches or estuaries.
The monobuoy alternative also minimizes eco~og1cal disruption
and is overall the most enVironmentally acceptable alternative.
10. A spillover benefit of the development of off-
shore ports is the decrease of vessel traffic density in
already ~eav1ly congested harbor channels.
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